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Abstract
Distributed denial of service attacks are often considered a security
problem. While this may be the way to view the problem with the Internet
of today, new network architectures attempting to address the issue should
view it as a scalability problem. In addition, they need to approach the
problem based on a rigorous foundation.
1 Overwhelming systems
Imagine a scene from a movie. A hacker is living happily with his computers
that fill up every corner of his house. Then one day, a soda manufacturer decides
to change the formula for his favorite carbonated drink, and not in a way that
makes the hacker happy. With his happiness being threatened, he decides to
crack into the manufacturer’s online systems, typing on his keyboard like mad,
until he manages to shut down the manufacturer and lets his ire be known.
In the real world, computer security incidents do not quite happen like this.
Typically, a programmer or a team of programmers in the employ of a criminal
enterprise, or even a legitimate government, will create malicious software that
can be spread in the form of trojans, viruses, or worms. This software is let
loose into the wild, infecting thousands or even millions of computers, most of
them exploited due to vulnerabilities in the software or poor security practices
by their users.1 This huge collection of infected computers, called a botnet [1],
lies dormant until someone finds a use for it, at which point some person, who
does not even necessarily possess much computer skill, leisurely instructs the
botnet to fulfill whatever nefarious purpose the person wants fulfilled.2
One of these nefarious purposes is to execute a distributed denial of service
attack [5] on a specific online system so that nobody can use it. A distributed
denial of service attack involves a very large number of computers all over the
network sending data to the single target system that is to be attacked. If the
1And often both, with so many networked computers failing to apply fixes that get rid of
old vulnerabilities.
2The author, not knowing anyone who uses botnets, does not really know if it is done
“leisurely”, but he is pretty sure that it does not involve mad typing skills.
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target system is unable to keep up with the deluge of incoming data, then it
will be unable to handle legitimate data that it is being sent, which basically
is the same as shutting down the target system as far as legitimate users are
concerned. As a concrete example, if a web server is being sent an overwhelming
number of web requests by a botnet, then legitimate users cannot access any
content from the web server.
2 It’s scalability, not security
Because distributed denial of service attacks can kill the availability of networked
systems, they are considered a security problem, and the thought processes
involved when trying to solve the problem are often in terms of defense, and
sometimes even offense [6], where systems attempt to detect an attack and
respond correspondingly.
With the current architectures for the Internet, the World Wide Web, and
many other systems built upon the Internet, there has been little choice but to
either use this approach, or to make an enormous investment so that enough
computing resources are available such that attackers cannot overwhelm a target
system. Only a few organizations can afford and are willing to make such
huge investments for the latter, while the rest of us try to cope by leaving
ourselves vulnerable to distributed denial service attacks or investing in “security
solutions” for detecting and handling them.
Either way, it has been a case of defenders and attackers leapfrogging each
other. Defenses are erected against distributed denial of service attacks, attacks
are devised to overcome these defenses, yet new defenses to handle these new
attacks arise, ad infinitum. And there is no indication that this can ever stop
given current network architectures.
This need not be the case when creating new network architectures. In fact, if
a new network architecture claims to be resistant to distributed denial of service
attacks, then it should not be the case. However, it is the author’s belief that if
a network architecture approaches the problem as a security problem, where it
attempts to detect distributed denial of service attacks and react accordingly,
then the same cycle today will merely repeat with the new architecture.
Distributed denial of service attacks are not the only situations in which
online systems can be overwhelmed. Being popular is another way that systems
get overwhelmed. While large organizations sometimes make large investments
in techniques such as load balancing or content distribution networks to handle
huge loads, individuals and smaller organizations usually are not able to afford
such investments. When the demand for some of their content or services rises
to a much more higher level than usual, their systems cannot keep up and
eventually end up inaccessible. The phenomenon even has a name, the “Slashdot
effect”, after how small websites would often be overwhelmed when the popular
Slashdot website linked to them.
While it may be the case that illegimate traffic from distributed denial of
service attacks and legitimate traffic from a huge surge in popularity have de-
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tectable differences, the differences are only going to grow smaller. The program-
mers of botnet software responsible for distributed denial of service attacks do
not want network operators able to filter out their attacks, so they will continue
to devise ways to make distributed denial of service attacks look like legitimate
traffic. And if there ever comes the day when there is no way to distinguish
distributed denial of service attacks from a huge surge in popularity, then trying
to detect attacks and block them becomes a lost cause.
The network operators of today have no choice but to handle distributed
denial of service attacks as a security problem. However, those designing new
network architectures should consider it a scalability problem. If a network
architecture is able to support the operation of any service without disruption
no matter any surge in network traffic, then smaller operators of networking
applications such as small websites will no longer have to worry about pop-
ularity becoming a curse. More importantly, distributed denial of service is
fundamentally cut off at its knees.
Long story short: In the Internet of the present, distributed denial of service
is a security problem; In creating the Internet of the future, it should be a
scalability problem.
3 Be rigorous
Even when a new network architecture is designed with scalability in mind from
the very start, if it is not rigorously shown to be scalable, then it would be quite
likely that there is still an unscalable aspect that malicious entities could exploit
in a distributed denial of service attack. This section will describe a cautionary
tale.
Content-centric networking [2] is a network architecture put forward to sim-
plify many aspects of the network compared to the Internet of today while
dramatically increasing flexibility. The aspect that we will focus on is its poten-
tial resistance to distributed denial of service attacks. In [2], the authors claim
that data-based distributed denial of service attacks are simply not possible, and
while interest-based attacks would be theoretically possible, they would also be
very easy to mitigate. While the former claim is not disputed here, the latter
already faces a problem with a sort of “push-pull” attack.
With a huge botnet, a malicious entity could divide the group into “pushers”
and “pullers”. The pushers willl generate a huge amount of content with distinct
names. The pullers, on the other hand, will generate a huge amount of interests
which pull these content, since it should not be too difficult for the pushers and
pullers to generate and request the same content names, programmatically or
otherwise. Because so many interests are being broadcast by the pullers in the
botnet, it can overfill the pending interest table (PIT) in a content router, which
can prevent a legitimate interest from being forwarded to where the content is,
which in turn prevents the legitimate consumer from receiving the content. It is
basically an interest-based distributed denial of service attack, and the concept
is shown in figure 1.
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Figure 1: Push-pull attack against a content-centric network.
Neither of the suggestions in [2] that should prevent a simpler interest-based
attack is sufficient to defend against this push-pull attack. The pullers request-
ing content generated by the pushers prevents throttling of interests based on
how many goes unfulfilled. And a botnet by its very nature exploits vulner-
able computers all over the network, so it is unlikely that filtering by name
prefix would be effective. Not only that, but given how a botnet is deployed by
infecting vulnerable computers, there is no guarantee that any cryptographic
protection will not be co-opted.
This attack was quickly thought up by the author after reading a technical
description of content-centric networking. If such an attack can be devised in a
short time, how many more attacks can be imagined by someone who spends all
their time trying to think of them? In fact, [4] describes several potential dis-
tributed denial of service attacks against content-centric networking, including
the push-pull attack described in this section.
The point is not that content-centric networking is fundamentally flawed in
terms of resisting distributed denial of service attacks. It is that if network
architectures are designed in a way such that it is only resistant to attacks their
designers think of, it will almost certainly be the case that other ways to execute
a distributed denial of service attack will be devised. The only way to ensure
that a network architecture is resistant to such attacks is to rigorously show,
ideally through mathematical proof, that no matter what happens,3 there is no
way to overwhelm any aspect of the architecture.4
3Within feasible constraints, of course. For example, destroying the Earth would be a very
definitive way to deny all services, but it is hardly a feasible attack.
4In fact, the author believes that such a design could be possible for content-centric net-
working.
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Admittedly, even mathematical proof of a system’s total scalability is not an
absolute guarantee that distributed denial of service attacks can never succeed
again. Just look at the development of side-channel attacks against crypto-
graphic systems that arose in the 1990s [3], which sidestepped assumptions that
mathematically guaranteed the security of various cryptographic algorithms.
However, such paradigm-shattering developments have got to be far rarer than
incremental advances: with a rigorous foundation, a network architecture could
be immune to distributed denial of service attacks for a decade or two, rather
than new attacks overcoming new defenses practically every year.
4 Concluding thoughts
It looks like the architecture underlying the Internet and the World Wide Web
today has aspects that are fundamentally not scalable. This will most likely
mean an endless cycle of new distributed denial of service attacks, defenses that
protect against these attacks, attacks that plow through these defenses, yet more
defenses, over and over again.
For brand new networking architectures that start from a clean slate, this
would not necessarily be the case. A network architecture that is scalable in all
aspects would be fundamentally immune to distributed denial of service attacks.
It has to be rigorously shown to be scalable, however. Otherwise, it is likely
that the same cycle that the Internet goes through today will just repeat in any
future Internet. If a totally scalable network architecture is proven impossible
to exist, i.e. a “full employment theorem for the distributed denial of service
field”, then we must be prepared to live with this unending cycle. The author
hopes that reality is more forgiving, and that such a network architecture can
indeed exist.
Finally, the author wishes to point out that a totally scalable network ar-
chitecture will not render obsolete all research related to detecting and reacting
to distributed denial of service attacks. Such attacks may no longer be “denial
of service” attacks in the future, but they may well still be “cost-increasing”
attacks by consuming more bandwidth, processing power, or storage than would
otherwise be required. This may not be as sensational as shutting down major
websites, but they would still be potential extra costs that could be used for
extortion.
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